

Capítulo udf

Epistemic Logics

This chapter covers the metatheory of epistemic logics. It is structured in a similar way to Aldo Antonelli's notes on classical basic modal logic, but has been rewritten by Audrey Yap in order to add material on bisimulation and dynamic epistemic logics.

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el.1 Introduction

aml:el:int: Just as modal logic deals with *modal propositions* and the entailment relations among them, epistemic logic deals with *epistemic propositions* and the entailment relations among them. Rather than interpreting the modal operators as representing possibility and necessity, the unary connectives are interpreted in epistemic or doxastic ways, to model knowledge and belief. For example, we might want to express claims like the following:

1. Richard knows that Calgary is in Alberta.
2. Audrey thinks it is possible that a dog is on the couch.
3. Richard knows that Audrey knows that her class is on Tuesdays.
4. Everyone knows that a year has 12 months.

Contemporary epistemic logic is often traced to Jaako Hintikka's *Knowledge and Belief*, from 1962, and it was written at a time when possible worlds semantics were becoming increasingly more used in logic. In fact, epistemic logics use most of the same semantic tools as other modal logics, but will interpret them differently. The main change is in what we take the *accessibility relation* to represent. In epistemic logics, they represent some form of *epistemic possibility*. We'll see that the epistemic notion that we're modelling will affect

the constraints that we want to place on the accessibility relation. And we'll also see what happens to correspondence theory when it is given an epistemic interpretation. You'll notice that the examples above mention two agents: Richard and Audrey, and the relationship between the things that each one knows. The epistemic logics we'll consider will be multi-agent logics, in which such things can be expressed. In contrast, a single-agent epistemic logic would only talk about what one individual knows or believes.

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el.2 The Language of Epistemic Logic

Definição el.1. Let G be a set of agent-symbols. The basic language of multi-agent epistemic logic contains

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1. The propositional constant for **falsidade** $\perp$.
2. The propositional constant for **verdade** $\top$.
3. A **infinitos enumeráveis** set of **variáveis proposicionais**: $p_0, p_1, p_2, \dots$
4. The propositional connectives: $\neg$ (negation), $\wedge$ (conjunction), $\vee$ (disjunction), $\rightarrow$ (**condicional**), $\leftrightarrow$ (**bicondicional**).
5. The knowledge operator K_a where $a \in G$.

If we are only concerned with the knowledge of a single agent in our system, we can drop the reference to the set G , and individual agents. In that case, we only have the basic operator K .

Definição el.2. *Fórmulas* of the epistemic language are inductively defined as follows:

1. $\perp$ is an atomic **fórmula**.
2. $\top$ is an atomic **fórmula**.
3. Every propositional variable p_i is an (atomic) **fórmula**.
4. If φ is a **fórmula**, then $\neg\varphi$ is a **fórmula**.
5. If φ and ψ are **fórmulas**, then $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ is a **fórmula**.
6. If φ and ψ are **fórmulas**, then $(\varphi \vee \psi)$ is a **fórmula**.
7. If φ and ψ are **fórmulas**, then $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$ is a **fórmula**.
8. If φ and ψ are **fórmulas**, then $(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi)$ is a **fórmula**.
9. If φ is a **fórmula** and $a \in G$, then $K_a\varphi$ is a **fórmula**.

10. Nothing else is a fórmula.

If a fórmula φ does not contain K_a , we say it is *modal-free*.

Definição el.3. While the K operator is intended to symbolize individual knowledge, E , often read as “everybody knows,” symbolizes group knowledge. Where $G' \subseteq G$, we define $E_{G'}\varphi$ as an abbreviation for

$$\bigwedge_{b \in G'} K_b \varphi.$$

We can also define an even stronger sense of knowledge, namely *common knowledge* among a group of agents G . When a piece of information is common knowledge among a group of agents, it means that for every combination of agents in that group, they all know that each other knows that each other knows ... ad infinitum. This is significantly stronger than group knowledge, and it is easy to come up with relational models in which a fórmula is group knowledge, but not common knowledge. We will use $C_G\varphi$ to symbolize “it is common knowledge among G that φ .”

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el.3 Relational Models

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The basic semantic concept for epistemic logics is the same as that of ordinary modal logics. Relational models still consist of a set of worlds, and an assignment that determines which *variáveis proposicionais* count as “true” at which worlds. And if we are only dealing with a single agent, we have a single accessibility relation as usual. However, if we have a multi-agent epistemic logic, then our single accessibility relation becomes a set of accessibility relations, one for each a in our set of agent symbols G .

A *relational model* consists of a set of worlds, which are related by binary accessibility relations—one for each agent—together with an assignment which determines which *variáveis proposicionais* are true at which worlds.

Definição el.4. A *model* for the multi-agent epistemic language is a triple $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$, where

1. W is a nonempty set of “worlds,”
2. For each $a \in G$, R_a is a binary accessibility relation on W , and
3. V is a function assigning to each *variável proposicional* p a set $V(p)$ of possible worlds.

When $R_a w w'$ holds, we say that w' is *accessible by a from w* . When $w \in V(p)$ we say p is *true at w* .

The mechanics are just like the mechanics for normal modal logic, just with more accessibility relations added in. For a given agent, we will generally interpret their accessibility relation as representing something about their informational states. For example, we often treat $R_a ww'$, as expressing that w' is consistent with a 's information at w . Or to put it another way, at w , they cannot tell the difference between world w and world w' .

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el.4 Truth at a World

Just as with normal modal logic, every epistemic model determines which **fórmulas** count as true at which worlds in it. We use the same notation “model $\mathfrak{M}$ makes **fórmula** φ true at world w ” for the basic notion of relational semantics. The relation is defined inductively and is identical to the normal modal case for all non-modal operators.

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Definição el.5. *Truth of a fórmula φ at w in a $\mathfrak{M}$, in symbols: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$, is defined inductively as follows:*

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1. $\varphi \equiv \perp$: Never $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \perp$.
2. $\varphi \equiv \top$: Always $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \top$.
3. $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash p$ iff $w \in V(p)$
4. $\varphi \equiv \neg\psi$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \nVdash \psi$.
5. $\varphi \equiv (\psi \wedge \chi)$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \psi$ and $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$.
6. $\varphi \equiv (\psi \vee \chi)$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \psi$ or $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$ (or both).
7. $\varphi \equiv (\psi \rightarrow \chi)$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \nVdash \psi$ or $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$.
8. $\varphi \equiv (\psi \leftrightarrow \chi)$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff either both $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \psi$ and $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$ or neither $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \psi$ nor $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$.
9. $\varphi \equiv K_a \psi$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w' \Vdash \psi$ for all $w' \in W$ with $R_a ww'$

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Here's where we need to think about restrictions on our accessibility relations, though. After all, by clause (9), a **fórmula** $K_a \psi$ is true at w whenever there are no w' with $R_a ww'$. This is the same clause as in normal modal logic; when a world has no successors, all $\Box$ -formulas are vacuously true there. This seems extremely counterintuitive if we think about K as representing *knowledge*. After all, we tend to think that there are *no* circumstances under which an agent might know both φ and $\neg\varphi$ at the same time.

One solution is to ensure that our accessibility relation in epistemic logic will always be *reflexive*. This roughly corresponds to the idea that the actual world is consistent with an agent's information. In fact, epistemic logics typically use S5, but others might use weaker systems depending on what exactly they want the K_a relation to represent.




Figura el.1: A simple epistemic model.

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Problema el.1. Consider which of the following hold in **Figura el.1**:

1. $\mathfrak{M}, w_1 \models \neg q$;
2. $\mathfrak{M}, w_1 \models K_a \neg q$;
3. $\mathfrak{M}, w_1 \models K_b \neg q$;
4. $\mathfrak{M}, w_2 \models K_b q \vee K_b \neg q$;
5. $\mathfrak{M}, w_2 \models K_a (K_b q \vee K_b \neg q)$;
6. $\mathfrak{M}, w_3 \models E_{\{a,b\}} \neg q$;

Now that we have given our basic definition of truth at a world, the other semantic concepts from normal modal logic, such as modal validity and entailment, simply carry over, applied to this new way of thinking about the interpretation for the modal operators.

We are now also in a position to give truth conditions for the common knowledge operator C_G . Recall from ?? that the *transitive closure* R^+ of a relation R is defined as

$$R^+ = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} R^n,$$

where

$$R^0 = R \text{ and } R^{n+1} = \{\langle x, z \rangle : \exists y (R^n xy \wedge Ryz)\}.$$

If R is ...	then ... is true in $\mathfrak{M}$:
	$K(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (Kp \rightarrow Kq)$ (Closure)
<i>reflexive</i> : $\forall w Rww$	$Kp \rightarrow p$ (Veridicality)
<i>transitive</i> : $\forall u \forall v \forall w ((Ruv \wedge Rvw) \rightarrow Ruw)$	$Kp \rightarrow KKp$ (Positive Introspection)
<i>euclidean</i> : $\forall w \forall u \forall v ((Rwu \wedge Rvw) \rightarrow Ruw)$	$\neg Kp \rightarrow K\neg Kp$ (Negative Introspection)

Tabela el.1: Four epistemic principles.

Then, where G is a group of agents, we define $R_G = (\bigcup_{b \in G} R_b)^+$ to be the transitive closure of the union of all agents' accessibility relations.

Definição el.6. If $G' \subseteq G$, we let $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash_{C_{G'}} \varphi$ iff for every w' such that $R_{G'}ww'$, $\mathfrak{M}, w' \Vdash \varphi$.

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el.5 Accessibility Relations and Epistemic Principles

Given what we already know about frame correspondence in normal modal logics, we might want to see what the characteristic **fórmulas** look like given epistemic interpretations. We have already said that epistemic logics are typically interpreted in S5. So let's take a look at how various epistemic principles are represented, and consider how they correspond to various frame conditions.

Recall from normal modal logic, that different modal **fórmulas** characterized different properties of accessibility relations. This table picks out a few that correspond to particular epistemic principles.

Veridicality, corresponding to the T axiom, is often treated as the most uncontroversial of these principles, as it represents that claim that if a **fórmula** is known, then it must be true. Closure, as well as Positive and Negative Introspection are much more contested.

Closure, corresponding to the K axiom, represents the idea that an agent's knowledge is closed under implication. This might seem plausible to us in some cases. For instance, I might know that if I am in Victoria, then I am on Vancouver Island. Barring odd skeptical scenarios, I do know that I am in Victoria, and this should also suggest that I know I am on Vancouver Island. So in this case, the logical closure of my knowledge might seem relatively intuitive. On the other hand, we do not always think through the consequences of our knowledge, and so this might lead to less intuitive results in other cases.

Positive Introspection, sometimes known as the KK-principle, is sometimes articulated as the statement that if I know something, then I know that I know. It is the epistemic counterpart of the 4 axiom. Correspondingly, negative

introspection is articulated as the statement that if I *don't* know something, then I know that I don't know it, which is the counterpart of the 5 axiom. Both of these seem to admit of relatively ordinary counterexamples, in which I am unsure whether or not I know something that I do in fact know.

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el.6 Bisimulations

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One remaining question that we might have about the expressive power of our epistemic language has to do with the relationship between models and the formulas that hold in them. We have seen from our frame correspondence results that when certain formulas are valid in a frame, they will also ensure that those frames satisfy certain properties. But does our modal language, for example, allow us to distinguish between a world at which there is a reflexive arrow, and an infinite chain of worlds, each of which leads to the next? That is, is there any formula A that might hold at only one of these two worlds?

Bisimulation is a relationship that we can define between relational models to say that they have effectively the same structure. And as we will see, it will capture a sense of equivalence between models that can be captured in our epistemic language.

Definição el.7 (Bisimulation). Let $M_1 = \langle W_1, R_1, V_1 \rangle$ and $M_2 = \langle W_2, R_2, V_2 \rangle$ be two relational models. And let $\mathcal{R} \subseteq W_1 \times W_2$ be a binary relation. We say that $\mathcal{R}$ is a *bisimulation* when for every $\langle w_1, w_2 \rangle \in \mathcal{R}$, we have:

1. $w_1 \in V_1(p)$ iff $w_2 \in V_2(p)$ for all **variáveis proposicionais** p .
2. For all agents $a \in A$ and worlds $v_1 \in W_1$, if $R_{1_a} w_1 v_1$ then there is some $v_2 \in W_2$ such that $R_{2_a} w_2 v_2$, and $\langle v_1, v_2 \rangle \in \mathcal{R}$.
3. For all agents $a \in A$ and worlds $v_2 \in W_2$, if $R_{2_a} w_2 v_2$ then there is some $v_1 \in W_1$ such that $R_{1_a} w_1 v_1$, and $\langle v_1, v_2 \rangle \in \mathcal{R}$.

When there is a bisimulation between M_1 and M_2 that links worlds w_1 and w_2 , we can also write $\langle M_1, w_1 \rangle \simeq \langle M_2, w_2 \rangle$, and call $\langle M_1, w_1 \rangle$ and $\langle M_2, w_2 \rangle$ *bisimilar*.

The different clauses in the bisimulation relation ensure different things. Clause 1 ensures that bisimilar worlds will satisfy the same modal-free formulas, since it ensures agreement on all **variáveis proposicionais**. The other two clauses, sometimes referred to as “forth” and “back,” respectively, ensure that the accessibility relations will have the same structure.

Teorema el.8. *If $\langle M_1, w_1 \rangle \simeq \langle M_2, w_2 \rangle$, then for every **fórmula** φ , we have that $\mathfrak{M}_1, w_1 \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}_2, w_2 \Vdash \varphi$.*




Figura el.2: Two bisimilar models.

Even though the two models pictured in [Figura el.2](#) aren't quite the same as each other, there is a bisimulation linking worlds w_1 and v_1 . This bisimulation will also link both w_2 and w_3 to v_2 , with the idea being that there is nothing expressible in our modal language that can really distinguish between them. The situation would be different if w_2 and w_3 satisfied different [variáveis proposicionais](#), however.

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el.7 Public Announcement Logic

Dynamic epistemic logics allow us to represent the ways in which agents' knowledge changes over time, or as they gain new information. Many of these represent changes in knowledge using informational *events* or *updates*. The most basic kind of update is a public announcement in which some formula is truthfully announced and all of the agents witness this taking place together. To do this, we expand the language as follows

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Definição el.9. Let G be a set of agent-symbols. The basic language of multi-agent epistemic logic with public announcements contains

1. The propositional constant for [falsidade](#) $\perp$.
2. The propositional constant for [verdade](#) $\top$.
3. A [infinitos enumeráveis](#) set of [variáveis proposicionais](#): $p_0, p_1, p_2, \dots$
4. The propositional connectives: $\neg$ (negation), $\wedge$ (conjunction), $\vee$ (disjunction), $\rightarrow$ ([condicional](#))
5. The knowledge operator K_a where $a \in G$.
6. The public announcement operator $[\psi]$ where ψ is a [fórmula](#).

The public announcement operator functions as a box operator, and our inductive definition of the language is given accordingly:

Definição el.10. *Fórmulas* of the epistemic language are inductively defined as follows:

1. $\perp$ is an atomic *fórmula*.
2. $\top$ is an atomic *fórmula*.
3. Every propositional variable p_i is an (atomic) *fórmula*.
4. If φ is a *fórmula*, then $\neg\varphi$ is a *fórmula*.
5. If φ and ψ are *fórmulas*, then $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ is a *fórmula*.
6. If φ and ψ are *fórmulas*, then $(\varphi \vee \psi)$ is a *fórmula*.
7. If φ and ψ are *fórmulas*, then $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$ is a *fórmula*.
8. If φ and ψ are *fórmulas*, then $(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi)$ is a *fórmula*.
9. If φ is a *fórmula* and $a \in G$, then $K_a\varphi$ is a *fórmula*.
10. If φ and ψ are *fórmulas*, then $[\varphi]\psi$ is a *fórmula*.
11. Nothing else is a *fórmula*.

The intended reading of the *fórmula* $[\varphi]\psi$ is “After φ is truthfully announced, ψ holds. It will sometimes also be useful to talk about common knowledge in the context of public announcements, so the language may also include the common knowledge operator $C_G\varphi$.

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el.8 Semantics of Public Announcement Logic

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sec Relational models for public announcement logics are the same as they were in epistemic logics. However, the semantics for the public announcement operator are something new.

aml:el:psm:
defn:mmodels **Definição el.11.** *Truth of a fórmula* φ at w in a $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$, in symbols: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$, is defined inductively as follows:

1. $\varphi \equiv \perp$: Never $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \perp$.
2. $\varphi \equiv \top$: Always $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \top$.
3. $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash p$ iff $w \in V(p)$
4. $\varphi \equiv \neg\psi$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \nVdash \psi$.
5. $\varphi \equiv (\psi \wedge \chi)$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \psi$ and $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$.




Figura el.3: Before and after the public announcement of p .

6. $\varphi \equiv (\psi \vee \chi)$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \psi$ or $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$ (or both).
7. $\varphi \equiv (\psi \rightarrow \chi)$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \nVdash \psi$ or $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$.
8. $\varphi \equiv (\psi \leftrightarrow \chi)$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff either both $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \psi$ and $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$ or neither $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \psi$ nor $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \chi$.
9. $\varphi \equiv K_a \psi$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w' \Vdash \psi$ for all $w' \in W$ with $R_a w w'$
10. $\varphi \equiv [\psi] \chi$: $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \Vdash \psi$ implies $\mathfrak{M} \mid \psi, w \Vdash \chi$

Where $\mathfrak{M} \mid \psi = \langle W', R', V' \rangle$ is defined as follows:

- a) $W' = \{u \in W : \mathfrak{M}, u \Vdash \psi\}$. So the worlds of $\mathfrak{M} \mid \psi$ are the worlds in $\mathfrak{M}$ at which ψ holds.
- b) $R'_a = R_a \cap (W' \times W')$. Each agent's accessibility relation is simply restricted to the worlds that remain in W' .
- c) $V'(p) = \{u \in W' : u \in V(p)\}$. Similarly, the propositional valuations at worlds remain the same, representing the idea that informational events will not change the truth value of propositional variables.

What is distinctive, then, about public announcement logics, is that the truth of a formula at $\mathfrak{M}$ can sometimes only be decided by referring to a model other than $\mathfrak{M}$ itself.

Notice also that our semantics treats the announcement operator as a $\Box$ operator, and so if a formula φ cannot be truthfully announced at a world, then $[\varphi]B$ will hold there trivially, just as all $\Box$ formulas hold at endpoints.

We can see the public announcement of a *fórmula* as shrinking a model, or restricting it to the worlds at which the *fórmula* was true. [Figura el.3](#) gives an example of the effects of publicly announcing p . One notable thing about that model is that agent b learns that p as a result of the announcement, while agent a does not (since a already knew that p was true).

More formally, we have $\mathfrak{M}, w_1 \Vdash \neg K_b p$ but $\mathfrak{M} \mid p, w'_1 \Vdash K_b p$. This implies that $\mathfrak{M}, w_1 \Vdash [p]K_b p$. But we have some even stronger claims that we can make about the result of the announcement. In fact, it is the case that $\mathfrak{M}, w_1 \Vdash [p]C_{\{a,b\}}p$. In other words, after p is announced, it becomes *common knowledge*.

We might wonder, though, whether this holds in the general case, and whether a truthful announcement of φ will *always* result in φ becoming common knowledge. It may be surprising that the answer is no. And in fact, it is possible to truthfully announce *fórmulas* that will no longer be true once they are announced. For example, consider the effects of announcing $p \wedge \neg K_b p$ at w_1 in [Figura el.3](#). In fact, $\mathfrak{M} \mid p$ and $\mathfrak{M} \mid (p \wedge \neg K_b p)$ are the same model. However, as we have already noted, $\mathfrak{M} \mid p, w'_1 \Vdash K_b p$. Therefore, $\mathfrak{M} \mid (p \wedge \neg K_b p), w'_1 \Vdash \neg(p \wedge \neg K_b p)$, so this is a *fórmula* that becomes false once it has been announced.

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Referências Bibliográficas