Propositional logic deals with formulas that are built from propositional variables using the propositional connectives $\neg$, $\land$, $\lor$, $\to$, and $\leftrightarrow$. Intuitively, a propositional variable $p$ stands for a sentence or proposition that is true or false. Whenever the “truth value” of the propositional variable in a formula is determined, so is the truth value of any formulas formed from them using propositional connectives. We say that propositional logic is truth functional, because its semantics is given by functions of truth values. In particular, in propositional logic we leave out of consideration any further determination of truth and falsity, e.g., whether something is necessarily true rather than just contingently true, or whether something is known to be true, or whether something is true now rather than was true or will be true. We only consider two truth values true (T) and false (F), and so exclude from discussion the possibility that a statement may be neither true nor false, or only half true. We also concentrate only on connectives where the truth value of a formula built from them is completely determined by the truth values of its parts (and not, say, on its meaning). In particular, whether the truth value of conditionals in English is truth functional in this sense is contentious. The material conditional $\to$ is; other logics deal with conditionals that are not truth functional.

In order to develop the theory and metatheory of truth-functional propositional logic, we must first define the syntax and semantics of its expressions. We will describe one way of constructing formulas from propositional variables using the connectives. Alternative definitions are possible. Other systems will choose different symbols, will select different sets of connectives as primitive, and will use parentheses differently (or even not at all, as in the case of so-called Polish notation). What all approaches have in common, though, is that the formation rules define the set of formulas inductively. If done properly, every expression can result essentially in only one way according to the formation rules. The inductive definition resulting in expressions that are uniquely readable means we can give meanings to these expressions using the same method—inductive definition.

Giving the meaning of expressions is the domain of semantics. The central concept in semantics for propositional logic is that of satisfaction in a valuation. A valuation $v$ assigns truth values $T$, $F$ to the propositional variables. Any valuation determines a truth value $v(\varphi)$ for any formula $\varphi$. A formula is satisfied in a valuation $v$ iff $v(\varphi) = T$—we write this as $v \models \varphi$. This relation can also be defined by induction on the structure of $\varphi$, using the truth functions for the logical connectives to define, say, satisfaction of $\varphi \land \psi$ in terms of satisfaction (or not) of $\varphi$ and $\psi$.

On the basis of the satisfaction relation $v \models \varphi$ for sentences we can then define the basic semantic notions of tautology, entailment, and satisfiability. A formula is a tautology, $\models \varphi$, if every valuation satisfies it, i.e., $v(\varphi) = T$ for any $v$. It is entailed by a set of formulas, $\Gamma \models \varphi$, if every valuation that satisfies all the formulas in $\Gamma$ also satisfies $\varphi$. And a set of formulas is satisfiable if some valuation satisfies all formulas in it at the same time. Because formulas
are inductively defined, and satisfaction is in turn defined by induction on the structure of formulas, we can use induction to prove properties of our semantics and to relate the semantic notions defined.

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