The Halting Problem

Since, in our construction, \( \text{Un}(k, x) \) is defined if and only if the computation of the function coded by \( k \) produces a value for input \( x \), it is natural to ask if we can decide whether this is the case. And in fact, it is not. For the Turing machine model of computation, this means that whether a given Turing machine halts on a given input is computationally undecidable. The following theorem is therefore known as the “undecidability of the halting problem.” We will provide two proofs below. The first continues the thread of our previous discussion, while the second is more direct.

**Theorem thy.1.** Let
\[
    h(k, x) = \begin{cases} 
    1 & \text{if } \text{Un}(k, x) \text{ is defined} \\
    0 & \text{otherwise.}
    \end{cases}
\]

Then \( h \) is not computable.

**Proof.** If \( h \) were computable, we would have a universal computable function, as follows. Suppose \( h \) is computable, and define
\[
    \text{Un}'(k, x) = \begin{cases} 
    fn\text{Un}(k, x) & \text{if } h(k, x) = 1 \\
    0 & \text{otherwise.}
    \end{cases}
\]

But now \( \text{Un}'(k, x) \) is a total function, and is computable if \( h \) is. For instance, we could define \( g \) using primitive recursion, by
\[
    g(0, k, x) \simeq 0 \\
    g(y + 1, k, x) \simeq \text{Un}(k, x);
\]
then
\[
    \text{Un}'(k, x) \simeq g(h(k, x), k, x).
\]

And since \( \text{Un}'(k, x) \) agrees with \( \text{Un}(k, x) \) wherever the latter is defined, \( \text{Un}' \) is universal for those partial computable functions that happen to be total. But this contradicts ??.

**Proof.** Suppose \( h(k, x) \) were computable. Define the function \( g \) by
\[
    g(x) = \begin{cases} 
    0 & \text{if } h(x, x) = 0 \\
    \text{undefined} & \text{otherwise.}
    \end{cases}
\]

The function \( g \) is partial computable; for example, one can define it as \( \mu y \ h(x, x) = 0 \). So, for some \( k \), \( g(x) \simeq \text{Un}(k, x) \) for every \( x \). Is \( g \) defined at \( k \)? If it is, then, by the definition of \( g \), \( h(k, k) = 0 \). By the definition of \( f \), this means that \( \text{Un}(k, k) \) is undefined; but by our assumption that \( g(k) \simeq \text{Un}(k, x) \) for every \( x \), this means that \( g(k) \) is undefined, a contradiction. On the other hand, if \( g(k) \) is undefined, then \( h(k, k) \neq 0 \), and so \( h(k, k) = 1 \). But this means that \( \text{Un}(k, k) \) is defined, i.e., that \( g(k) \) is defined.
We can describe this argument in terms of Turing machines. Suppose there were a Turing machine $H$ that took as input a description of a Turing machine $K$ and an input $x$, and decided whether or not $K$ halts on input $x$. Then we could build another Turing machine $G$ which takes a single input $x$, calls $H$ to decide if machine $x$ halts on input $x$, and does the opposite. In other words, if $H$ reports that $x$ halts on input $x$, $G$ goes into an infinite loop, and if $H$ reports that $x$ doesn’t halt on input $x$, then $G$ just halts. Does $G$ halt on input $G$? The argument above shows that it does if and only if it doesn’t—a contradiction. So our supposition that there is a such Turing machine $H$, is false.